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Abstract
Health impact assessments (HIAs) across the globe may be used by governments and
industries to secure approval for unconventional gas extraction developments. HIA is
an umbrella term that covers an array of health review and assessment practices,
ranging from the very general to quite specific and technical health studies. Our
concern in this paper is principally with the specialist end of the HIA continuum
and particularly its application to unconventional gas extraction in the UK. We out-
line the context within which HIAs in unconventional gas extraction may be con-
ducted. We then explain what HIAs may do. HIAs are often commissioned from
consultancy companies to assess unconventional gas extraction project risks and
benefits and propose mitigation measures. Communities can rarely afford HIAs in
the planning process and may consider them biased when commissioned by vested
interests. The oil and gas industry uses these techniques for its own ends. Hiring
experts, be they specialist consultants, researchers, lobbyists, ex-government offi-
cials, or regulators, to influence planning and regulation is a well-tried tactic and
structural advantage exploited by industry in seeking license to operate. Equitable
and ethical HIA principles are urgently needed in the UK in relation to unconven-
tional gas to secure the integrity and probity of the emerging regulatory system and
address concerns regarding unregulated practitioners.
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Introduction
There are many public health concerns raised by the widespread application of
risky and novel technologies associated with unconventional gas extraction
(UGE) currently on the policy agenda. These concerns pertain to the processes
and technologies deployed, as well as to the emerging regulatory landscape
surrounding UGE. Given the uncertainties in risks involved, health impact
assessments (HIAs) globally have become key to securing approval for UGE
developments. However, a critical analysis of the way in which HIAs have been
used suggests that, in the exploitation of natural gas resources, ideology and
expertise play a key role in downplaying hazards for workers and communities.
We outline in this report the scope of diﬀerent types of impact assessments and
how they relate to UGE, the regulatory context within which HIAs are applied
to UGE in the UK and draw attention to how the precautionary principle
should inform policy on UGE. The latter part of the paper examines the use
of science in HIAs for UGE approval in the UK.
Health Impact Assessments
There are a range of ways to assess the impact of policies and practice on health,
with diﬀerent foci and approaches. The key ones are identiﬁed in Table 1 below.
Many questions are raised as to how and why HIA practitioners can and do
build consensus and exactly how and by whom positive and negative health
consequences of a development can be accurately assessed. Best practice in
HIAs suggests industry should consult and listen to communities, but this can
simply be used by companies as a superﬁcial way, after a few public meetings, of
arguing that consultation requirements have been fulﬁlled and their develop-
ments can proceed. Assessing the potential positive and negative health eﬀects of
a development is equally problematic and open to manipulation with positive
eﬀects sometimes inﬂated and negative eﬀects downplayed.
A comprehensive impact assessment would include an investigation of behav-
ioral impacts that covered likely eﬀects on not just physical health but also mental
health and well-being. The indirect environmental health impacts in terms of
sustainability (fuel, products, transport, packaging, disposal, energy and water
use, and so on linked to resource usage and public health eﬀects), pollution, and
contamination also require assessment. Tools for such assessments may not be
readily available or easily applied and assessing impacts of environmental health
policy can be highly problematic. Various forms of risk analysis and cost–beneﬁt
analysis may be used to justify ﬁndings in environmental health impact assess-
ments.1 Beneﬁts can be inﬂated and risks and costs not fully quantiﬁed.
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Professional HIA practitioners often rely on exposure indicators to assess if the
outcomes from an HIA have been met rather than reductions or increases in ill-
health, as the latter are diﬃcult to measure due to multiple causes. However, such
an argument marginalizes epidemiological and other health studies and may lead
to industry and governments trying to dispense with these approaches all together
in HIAs. This removes a public health obligation from companies and is likely to
disadvantage communities. Simply because health research is complex does not
provide an excuse for abandoning it in favor of the equally fraught ﬁeld of accur-
ate multiple exposure assessment and the determination of what are safe exposure
standards. What should be avoided is an approach that favors exposure measures
simply because these oﬀer developers a more compliance-friendly evaluation tool-
kit than robust epidemiological metrics.2,3
Occupational HIAs are also necessary in HIAs but may be superﬁcially
addressed. Work environment is the Cinderella of the public health world.4
HIA papers published in occupational and environmental health journals
often do not directly fully consider occupational health although they do so
for environmental health.5
A public health impact assessment (PHIA) could in theory bring all these
elements together. In practice, however, technically and legally HIAs and envir-
onmental impact assessments (EIAs) do not reveal if an industry from a public
health perspective is one that should be approved. Instead, they oﬀer measures
to “mitigate” project eﬀects. There is considerable variability in the metrics,
methodologies, and motives of HIAs. These can range from the very general
(and indeed superﬁcial) to quite specialized and detailed studies using methodol-
ogies and assumptions that can withstand peer review and scrutiny.
Strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) are meant to be used to support
sustainable development, to improve the evidence base for strategic decisions, to
facilitate and respond to consultation with stakeholders, and to streamline other
processes such as EIAs of individual development projects. SEAs are used
throughout the European Union (EU) but do not replace EIAs.
The EU directive aims to provide a high level of protection to the environment and
to contribute to the integration of environmental considerations into the prepar-
ation and adoption of plans and programs with a view to promoting sustainable
development, by ensuring that . . . a SEA is carried out on certain plans and
programs which are likely to have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the environment.6
SEAs have been produced for UGE.7
UGE in Context: Processes and Regulation
UGE may involve coal bed methane, underground coal gasiﬁcation, or fracking
depending on geological and related features. Coal bed methane is a form of
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natural gas extracted from coal seams underground in various ways that may
include drilling and removing water from the seams to lower pressure and so
extract the methane gas. Underground coal gasiﬁcation, in some varied forms,
involves drilling under land or sea to get air and oxygen into coal seams. Coal is
heated or burned in situ and the gases produced (such as methane, hydrogen,
carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide) are captured. The process presents
threats of groundwater contamination. Fracking again in various forms involves
fracturing of shale rocks using considerable quantities of pressurized water,
sand, and other additives to obtain the gas underground.
While the industry often claims that UGE is a tried and tested process, it
remains the case that some of the technologies and materials used in these
processes are relatively new and do not yet have an established risk or safety
proﬁle. In essence, many but not all of the public health impacts of these tech-
nologies at diﬀerent levels are as yet unknown, though there is an emerging body
of evidence to suggest that these impacts may be much more signiﬁcant than
previously assumed by regulators and policy makers.8,9 Given the population
densities where UGE licenses have been auctioned, we argue that under condi-
tions of uncertainty the precautionary principle should become a lodestar for
how policy makers should orient to UGE-associated risks.
In the UK, UGE has been approved and developed in often fragmented, com-
plex and even contradictory ways. Successive UK government policies have been
informed by neoliberal ideological assumptions that promote free markets and
deregulation. A key feature of neoliberalism in practice has been the vital role of
the state in creating markets, business-friendly regulation, and the conditions for
private accumulation. Neoliberals do not necessarily oppose regulation per se;
rather they oppose those regulations that impede proﬁt-making. Such regulations
are often located at the nexus of public health and environmental protection.
Governments committed to UGE and the associated industries argue that it
will be tightly and eﬀectively regulated, carried out by companies who can and
will demonstrate good practice, and that communities are consulted and empow-
ered in the planning process. Some governments acknowledge the fact of global
climate change linked to fossil fuel consumption but still pursue major UGE
growth in what appears to be an untenable long-term policy.10
This paper analyses the use of HIA in UGE regulation. First, the develop-
ment of the UGE industry is contextualized and related to conventional under-
standings of risk assessment as a development evaluation tool. The problems
with industry-commissioned science are then examined in the context of public
health and public interest questions. The parallels between the use and abuse of
scientiﬁc evidence in other health and public interest domains (tobacco and
climate change) and the ongoing debate about the safety and beneﬁts of UGE
are considered.11–13 We then focus on the substantive issue of PHIA and address
how this is deployed in planning processes. We devote some attention to the role
and regulation of HIA consultants. This raises far-reaching questions about the
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nature and independence of regulatory processes which we discuss in the context
of the pressing question of equity and ethics in regulating for public beneﬁt.
Risky Business? Shale Gas, UGE, and Assessing Risk
Signiﬁcant shale gas reserves for UGE exist in the Americas, Europe, the Indian
subcontinent, Asia, Africa, and Australia. Pumping sand, water, and other sub-
stances into the ground where shale is present releases gases for use as an energy
source.14 Such extraction methods may not be new,9 but the scale of extraction,
the range of chemicals used to facilitate such extraction, and the huge water
usage sometimes involved is.15 Globally accurate estimates of the human popu-
lations exposed to UGE chemicals, by-products, and contaminants do not yet
exist. Detailed exposure studies of the potential eﬀects of UGE on short-,
middle-, and long-term health of those exposed are emerging and discussed
later, but there are many gaps in our knowledge on health impacts. We do
know that some owners of land or those supplying plant, equipment, and mater-
ials for UGE may sometimes but not always gain “short-term” beneﬁts.16 There
will always be economic winners and losers with UGE, and the former have a
strong vested interest in expanding the industry.
The UGE industry is committed to developing its energy and feedstock
resource. Industry and several governments (including the UK) have argued
over several years that UGE will be well regulated through government and
agency actions, industry will adopt best practice, public and community con-
sultation will be eﬀective and extensive, and overall impacts on global climate
change will be beneﬁcial. Little weight is attached to broader arguments that
UGE will not signiﬁcantly reduce carbon emissions, slow down global climate
change, and so impact on public health globally. The UGE industry produces
natural gas—and so contributes signiﬁcantly to global climate change that now
endangers public health globally. The American Public Health Association
(APHA) in 2012 noted,
Although natural gas burns more cleanly than coal, a recent study argues that
replacing all of the world’s coal power plants with natural gas would do little to
slow global warming this century. Switching from coal to natural gas would cut the
warming eﬀect in 100 years’ time by only about 20%. Although a 20% decrease in
warming over 100 years is signiﬁcant, the consequences of the warming not pre-
vented will have grave implications for public health. In addition, some projections
suggest that obtaining natural gas through (fracking) actually produces more
greenhouse gas emissions than does coal production and burning.14
Industry and many governments are often more concerned with potential eco-
nomic beneﬁts and emphasize managing rather than avoiding risks. The UK and
Scottish governments may adopt what is presented by industry as a readily
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available transitional energy resource, especially where there is no commitment
to or immediate possibility of moving to sustainable energy sources. Yet, several
forms of UGE are novel extraction processes and have not been widely tested in
many countries.17
Risk, Complexity, and Precaution: Assessing UGE
Development
Risk assessments represent a set of tools for examining industrial processes and
chemical and engineering hazards. There are a variety of approaches to assessing
risk, and while there have been considerable eﬀorts to harmonize risk assess-
ment, even the International Standards Organization still cautions that its
guidance is “not intended for certiﬁcation, regulatory or contractual use.”18
Given the variability of methods and metrics, it is unsurprising that governmen-
tal risk assessments of UGE are often incomplete and frequently contested in the
scientiﬁc community. The risk management strategies that ﬂow from these may
be questioned, but they nevertheless prevail in many policy and regulatory
processes.
Drawing on generic risk assessments, project-speciﬁc assessments occur in
EIAs and Environmental Statements (ESs). Whilst the tools and principles of
HIA are the same worldwide, how exactly they have been implemented may vary
greatly, for example, in scale and scope and between industry-employed HIA
consultants and those in regulatory agencies or academia in the way data are
validated. Moreover, there are no universally agreed standards for incorporating
or ignoring geographical, demographic, geological, scale, and socioeconomic
variables in HIAs. So various risk assessments can be used in HIAs looking at
a wide range of possible health eﬀects—negative and positive—of a proposed
project and how to mitigate adverse eﬀects. UGE uses chemicals in the extrac-
tion process and in the construction and transport stages that may endanger air
and water quality and present occupational and environmental threats to
workers. There is incidental or accidental methane leakage in UGE production
processes. UGE may also produce a wide range of other pollutants deliberately
or accidentally such as benzene, particulate matter including PM2.5 s and radon
which can all contribute to a signiﬁcant European as well as global environmen-
tal burden of disease sometimes at very low levels.19
Past risk assessments of UGE have explored what might be termed well-
established risks similar or identical to those in the conventional gas industry
but also some new risks. For instance, in 2012, in Germany, in a risk assessment
study of fracking funded by Exxon-Mobil, scientists identiﬁed what they viewed
as new risks associated with UGE including the proximity of gas reserves to
usable groundwater reserves and proximity to ecosystems depending on ground-
water. The research also suggests new risk dimensions are associated with the
high number of wells required, greater land usage, and more people aﬀected by
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necessary infrastructure developments: “more people and in particular agricul-
ture, tourism, and nature conservation are directly aﬀected in a given region.”
Fracking in tight spaces, greater water usage, and greater energy use in drilling
are also identiﬁed in the overall risk proﬁle of fracking.20 The study discusses the
need for precaution in risk assessment but does not explicitly draw on the “pre-
cautionary principle” approach. Similarly AEA, environmental consultants in
2012 looked at some aspects of fracking and risk for the EU, and, although
noting the precautionary principle, neglected exploring any signiﬁcant applica-
tion of the approach.21
The principle has been deﬁned so that “when an activity raises threats of
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and eﬀect relationships are not fully established scien-
tiﬁcally.”22 The precautionary principle includes taking action in the face of
uncertainty, shifting burdens of proof to those creating risks, analysis of alter-
natives to potentially harmful activities, and participatory decision-making
methods.
In essence, the precautionary principle reframes questions around the environmen-
tal and public health impacts of development in terms of developers fully scoping
and justifying proposals rather than opponents having to unequivocally establish
that developments are dangerous or harmful. The precautionary principle invites a
new set of questions that reﬂect the need to avoid harm before it is done: “How
much contamination can be avoided while still maintaining necessary values?”
“What are the alternatives to this activity that achieve a desired goal (a service,
product, etc.)?” and “Do we need this activity in the ﬁrst place?”23
While the precautionary principle appears an intuitively appropriate frame to
use in considering UGE, those questioning UGE based on the precautionary
principle have often been viewed as mischievous24 and labeled “scaremongers”
by some politicians and civil servants.
Expertise, Hazards, and Risk Assessment: The Role of
HIA Consultants in UGE
Table 2 below illustrates the extensive range of hazards attached to all forms of
UGE along with risks that could materialize if exposures occurred at any or
varied levels over diﬀerent periods of time. All demonstrate the need for a pre-
cautionary approach in conducting HIAs of UGE processes.
In the case of UGE, the practice of HIA consultants from the commercial and
academic sectors is varied. Some HIA practitioners have concluded that they
believe all necessary information is available to assess UGE, and they consider
the industry safe if risks are mitigated. These consultants tend to work more
frequently for the UGE industry rather than in academia or for the public
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sector. Some companies like the multinational RPS have a strong UGE focus in
their work for the private sector. They aim to help “clients develop natural
energy resources across the complete asset life cycle, combining our technical
and commercial skill with a wide knowledge of environmental issues.”25 The
emphasis is clearly on commercial development. Similarly, the environmental
consulting corporation, AMEC Environment & Infrastructure UK (AMEC) has
worked for local authorities and government as well as the private sector on
UGE. AMEC stresses its role on EIA is to adopt
a “risk management” approach that involves informing our clients as soon as we
identify potential environmental eﬀects that could be a risk to them obtaining
consent so that they can modify the relevant aspects of their scheme - early
identiﬁcation of these risks can avoid unnecessary design and assessment costs.26
Moreover, AMEC oﬀers a full range of services geared toward securing consent
for development:
Our environmental specialists can predict the likely environmental eﬀects and rec-
ommend appropriate mitigation. Our engineers can help design these mitigation
measures into your process, saving money on more costly “end of pipe”
solutions. . ..We can even provide advice to clients in the developing area of
Corporate Responsibility; leading the way to a more sustainable future for the
oil and gas industry.27
Mitigation is not simply a theoretical means of legitimating any development; it
is also a lucrative ﬁeld of environmental consultancy.
When various reports and statements from health and environmental con-
sultants on UGE are examined, it becomes clear that a range of “opinions” are
oﬀered. A 2014 report by an HIA consultant for a coal bed methane application
was able to state categorically that the proposed project was compliant “with all
environmental standards set to protect health and changes in environmental
health pathways neither present a concentration or exposure suﬃcient to quan-
tify any adverse health outcomes.”28 The conclusion was supported by the con-
sultant’s view that no environmental regulations to protect health had ever been
breached, and no regulatory body had issued any enforcement notice about
earlier operations.
The questions of regulation and enforcement, industry practice, and limits
to current knowledge linked to risk assessments and the lack of data on
health risks associated with UGE are at the nub of the debate about the
health impacts of UGE. One of the key functions of impact assessment in
this contested policy ﬁeld appears to be building consensus and engaging in
some form of consultation with communities, if only as a means to secure
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regulatory consent. However, one RPS report alleges communities reﬂected a
“level of misunderstanding of the concepts of hazard and risk.”28
Communities resist such an assessment and have also strongly contested
the view that the company involved and its consultants had engaged in
any meaningful consultations with them on the planned development.
Nowhere in this report does the consultant fully address mental health and
well-being issues that should be a signiﬁcant part of many researchers’ assess-
ments of potential health impacts of UGE. The consultant also appeared to
rely heavily on the Public Health England (PHE) report17 on shale gas chem-
icals.28 This report has been heavily critiqued by public health professionals
working in the ﬁeld and is discussed later.29
An example of a very diﬀerent approach to UGE health impacts is illustrated
in a report commissioned for Lancashire County Council on a fracking project
conducted by Ben Cave Associates in 2014.30 It is far more measured in its
judgments, openly recognizes the data gaps that exist in the ﬁeld, frequently
acknowledges the burgeoning literature on UGE exposures and eﬀects, and
was based on enabling communities to have an active role in monitoring and
oversight of an HIA. The report also called for the collection of baseline health
data (in contrast to the RPS assessment even though the company had been
active for some years), and the report was circumspect about UGE health
impacts. “We do not make deﬁnitive statements on the potential eﬀects on
health arising from the current applications. . . . .Uncertainties remain, for
example the range of potential health eﬀects and the timescale over which moni-
toring should take place.”30
The report further noted:
The over-riding responses about the two proposed exploration sites voiced by
members of the local communities who attended the workshops were those of
fear, anxiety and stress, which are aﬀecting their mental wellbeing, with some
people experiencing sleep disturbance and depression.30
The frankness of the report was possibly related to the fact that it was commis-
sioned by a local authority and helped to inform the local Director of Public
Health’s view of the proposed projects who noted the main risks were “a lack of
public trust and conﬁdence, stress and anxiety from uncertainty that could lead
to poor mental well-being, noise-related health eﬀects due to continuous drilling
and issues related to capacity for ﬂow-back wastewater treatment and
disposal.”31
With regard to the UGE industry, it is fundamental that the risks associated
with it are well understood, properly analyzed, and fully described before any
project-speciﬁc EIA and associated HIA is conducted. The industry, its constitu-
ent companies, and their preferred consultants commissioned to conduct EIAs
and HIAs on occasions fail to acknowledge these requirements
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Serviceable Science? The Abuse of Science and
Technology
The notion that science remains disinterested and pursued independently of
wider political and economic interests is an increasingly untenable position.
Power and inﬂuence can be exercised in the commissioning and focus of HIAs
conducted on behalf of the UGE industry. Reviews of research can cherry-pick
the work to be reviewed or simply exclude papers indicating potential problems
for public health. Moreover, superﬁcial and ﬂawed industry-funded studies can
feed into HIAs. Work that points to inconclusive or supportive results are
repeatedly referenced and cited. Some of the “no eﬀect” UGE studies from
institutes in Texan and Pennsylvanian universities have since been discredited
and some of these institutes closed as a result of conﬂicts of interest linked to
funding from and investments in the UGE industry.32 Other nonindustry studies
have, however, recorded adverse health eﬀects near UGE sites. Some of these
focus on the very young, the old, and the ill.33 These are exactly the groups that
the World Health Organization and bodies such as the APHA have highlighted
as vulnerable to even low-level chemical exposures and so meriting special atten-
tion in HIAs.14
The HIA process is often considered to be suﬃcient by politicians and plan-
ners when it meets legal and planning requirements and is technically feasible.
However, industrial and commercial manipulation of science, law, and policy to
downplay occupational and environmental health risks remains a pressing con-
cern because it may subvert HIA processes. It is not uncommon for industry to
create doubt and uncertainty to attack science and public health indicating
established risks or potential risks from industrial activity.34,35 The tobacco
industry provides the classic and most thoroughly investigated example of
manipulation of science and unethical research. The industry ﬁrst cast doubt
on early high-quality research identifying the health hazards of smoking, then on
the hazards of passive or secondary smoking, and now we are entering debates
about third-hand smoke, the smoke on ﬁxtures and ﬁttings, toys, and materials
around us.
There is a voluminous literature on the abuse of science in relation to public
health issues. The evidence of co-opted and corrupted science is perhaps most
starkly revealed in the tobacco archive, based on internal industry documents
disclosed after successful class actions against the tobacco industry in the United
States.35,36 Similar concerns exist in relation to the evidence base surrounding
the eﬃcacy of some pharmaceuticals, and there are issues about how conﬂicts of
interest are assessed and the ways in which consultant scientists sponsored by
industry produce industry-friendly expert opinion.11–13 It is therefore very
important that the lessons around how science is deployed in public and regu-
latory aﬀairs are properly drawn from other domains and applied to the rela-
tively new ﬁeld of UGE, and associated HIA practice. Just as industry contested
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each set of arguments about the various hazards and related risks due to
tobacco, so now the UGE industry and its consultants may employ similar
strategies.
Factions of the oil and gas industry have a recent record of promoting dubi-
ous science and funding advocacy organizations in relation to climate science, in
order to foster doubt about the causes of climate change.37,38 The pursuit of such
public policy strategies draws some key lessons from the lobbying and propa-
ganda tactics of the tobacco industry in terms of staving oﬀ meaningful regula-
tion by creating doubt and uncertainty regarding public health and scientiﬁc
evidence. This is a key component of the corporate strategy of some companies
in the extractive industries39 and is a strategy that crucially relies on the impri-
matur of scientiﬁc authority to articulate these criticisms undermining the evi-
dence, usually in the form of some so-called independent consultants and hired
experts.
Linked to claims of safety for materials and processes, the UGE industry has
made statements that equipment and processes will not fail, and therefore there
will be no pollution, accidents, and incidents.40 Such claims are fanciful. As the
United Nations Environment Programme accurately observed in 2012:
Hydrologic fracking may result in unavoidable environmental impacts even if UG
is extracted properly, and more so if done inadequately.41 Even if risk can be
reduced theoretically,42 in practice many accidents from leaky or malfunctioning
equipment as well as from poor practices regularly occur. This may be due to
pressure to reduce costs, poor staﬀ training, or to undetected leaks leading to
contamination of the ground water.41
It is necessary to scrutinize government and industry statements carefully with
regard to UGE approval, inspection, and monitoring, as the regulation of UGE
according to a number of reputable international and EU organizations remains
ﬂawed.41,43,44 “A publicly available, comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
European regulatory framework concerning shale gas and tight oil extraction is
not available and should be developed.”43 It may well be very premature to
approve applications without such a framework.
The HIA Process
Evidence of sound PHIAs should be reﬂected in ESs, EIAs, and environmental
impact statements. PHIAs should consider the short-, medium-, and long-term
impacts of projects.45 Speciﬁcally for UGE, they should include consideration of
the public health eﬀects on climate (micro and macro), the possible impact on
the development of sustainable energy in a country because funding for UGE
could, for example, move funding away from wind or wave energy developments
(which of course again impacts directly and indirectly on public health), impacts
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on worker health and safety, a proper estimate of jobs created and jobs lost by
UGE again over its complete lifetime, a community wellness, and mental HIA.8
The standard template for “HIAs” produced by companies within their ESs is
usually not comprehensive and may be seriously inadequate.45 They often rely
on secondary studies and out-of-date reviews of the scientiﬁc literature.
Crucially, they contain many gaps in terms of addressing all the public health
issues associated with UGE. For example, the assessment of public health
impacts of unconventional gas production made by the UK Royal Society
lacked any public health author and contained only a chapter on risk manage-
ment which did not address public health. This limited assessment46 simply
asserted rather than demonstrated that health, safety, and environmental risks
could be managed by operational best practice and strong regulation. Similarly,
the PHE agency assessment excluded signiﬁcant risks and data.17 The PHE draft
review notes many data gaps and speciﬁcally excludes consideration of wider
public health impacts involving socioeconomic eﬀects, work environments, and
climate change. This is a case where absence of evidence is deﬁnitely not evidence
of absence, as PHE appear to believe. The report considered shale gas risks were
low if operations were properly regulated and run, yet noted failures exactly
because of these reasons! This very superﬁcial assessment has become a politic-
ally signiﬁcant report, as it is repeatedly cited by industry and associated UGE
boosters as evidence that fracking is safe.
The PHE report was widely criticized and described as a “leap of faith unsub-
stantiated by scientiﬁc evidence” for its claim that U.S. public health problems
would probably not apply in the UK.29 Critics argued that the conclusions that
shale gas presented a low public health risk “is not substantiated by the litera-
ture” and that PHE ignored the inherent industry risks whatever regulation
applies (casing failures, cement failures, wastewater spillage) as well as the fact
that UGE in the UK would often occur in heavily populated areas.29
Far more cautious approaches to UGE, including bans and moratoriums,
exist in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Scotland. Yet, those promoting
UGE in the UK repeatedly cite the PHE report without qualiﬁcation and fail to
mention the APHA policy on high-volume hydraulic fracturing of unconven-
tional gas reserves14 which details many concerns and demonstrates the necessity
of robust public HIAs.
Policies that anticipate potential public health threats, require greater transparency,
use a precautionary approach in the face of uncertainty, and provide for monitor-
ing and adaptation as understanding of risks increases may signiﬁcantly reduce the
negative public health impacts of this approach to natural gas extraction.14
The Association further noted the need for regulations that address cumulative
impacts and multiple sources because “Individual drilling operations may not
create air emissions that trigger regulation under existing environmental laws.
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However, the cumulative impacts of emissions may create signiﬁcant public
health threats for local communities or regions” which require “projections of
aggregate emissions under expected extraction scenarios . . . for regulation of
individual sources.”14
Moreover, public health life cycle analyses, which include cost–beneﬁt ana-
lyses to assess the overall implications for society and its citizens and which
enable public engagement over the consequences,43 should ideally be conducted
for UGE projects, but these either do not exist or are not publicly available.
While there may be more transparency in the future on UGE chemicals used,
this will not address the fact that many past “negative” studies of UGE hazards
which were compromised by a lack of information about speciﬁc chemicals or
mixtures used will likely continue to be cited in future without critical appraisal.
HIAs often rely on industry-generated data and opinion either disclosed only to
government agencies or through UGE companies and their chemical suppliers.
That some HIA professionals appear to accept such industry data with little
query or qualiﬁcation is highly problematic. There have been few attempts out-
side the United States (where the industry is most developed) to conduct more
detailed assessments of UGE substances in light of current literature for signiﬁ-
cant potential public health problems.
Assessing the health impacts of water and air pollution illustrate some of the
diﬃculties. Practitioners often rely on summary data or industry data and pass
their draft reports to companies for comment before publication. Whilst there
are arguments that the methods and controls for handling wastewater from
UGE will vary between the United States and the UK, nevertheless the process
inevitably requires vast quantities of water and treatment and disposal. Up to
eight million gallons of water could be used to frack a single well. In the United
States, lagoons have been used to store wastewater. In the UK, such water may
be treated and tankered oﬀ-site. There are suggestions that wastewater could be
piped from sites in Central Scotland where there are many disused coal mines
and related subsidence. Neither the companies nor their HIA consultants seem
to have fully factored these local conditions into their risk assessments of pipes
for gas and wastewater extraction.
The extent of exposure to hazardous chemicals in UGE is substantial. The
APHA estimated that up to one hundred thousand gallons of chemical addi-
tives could be used in the life of a fracked well and wells could be fracked up to
eight times14 Links exist between many of these chemicals and their eﬀects on
the respiratory and gastrointestinal systems, the brain/nervous system, immune
and cardiovascular systems, and the endocrine system.50 One recent U.S. study
identiﬁed a range of toxicity concerns related just to biocide use in UGE
including evidence of carcinogenicity, endocrine disruption, chemical inter-
actions, chemical degradation, and several data gaps.47 A number of known
and suspect carcinogens have been identiﬁed in UGE processes including ben-
zene and silica.
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Industry argues that these exposures are likely to be rare because of eﬀective
engineering controls, of very low levels so as not to be hazardous and confounded
by the presence of carcinogens produced by other (sometimes natural background)
sources. However, even very low levels of carcinogens still present a public health
threat when there is low-level exposure of large populations. Additionally, studies
fromother sectors show that safe levels of exposures to carcinogens such as benzene
do not exist.48 Yet, commercial HIA practitioners have frequently repeated these
ﬂawed arguments and all too often express an innocent and unfounded belief in
infallible engineering solutions and closed systems.20
However, reports of failures in engineering controls and well safety are well
documented.16,29,54 Recent studies suggest that eﬀective regulatory regimes will
require very signiﬁcant resources if UGE goes ahead on a large scale.
For example, researchers ﬂagged leaks and poor monitoring at existing UK
onshore oil and gas sites with a review of 2152 wells drilled from 1902 to 2013
where they found up to one hundred “orphaned” wells for which no ﬁrm is
responsible. Although only two cases of well “failure” were recorded, the
legacy sites were not monitored for leaks.54
An underlying problem in risk assessment of UGE is both the lack of data on
chemical hazards (where the identiﬁed data gap has not been closing51) and the
lack of transparency in what the contents of UGE chemicals are. Extensive risk
assessments are essential before proper HIAs can be conducted on particular
projects, but these do not yet exist for UGE.14 In the late 1990s, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency found that 43 percent of high-volume chem-
icals used had no toxicity information available, and only 7 percent had a full set
of basic toxicity information available. By 2006, the percentage of high-volume
chemicals with partial hazard assessments in the United States was only around
10 percent, and none had complete hazard assessments. This means that, in
2011, when the U.S. Congress identiﬁed over 2500 fracking products containing
750 chemicals and other components,14 the majority of these agents lacked
proper toxicity characterization.
This problem is further compounded by the lack of disclosure of chemicals
used in UGE highlighted by the APHA14 and others.52 Operational risk assess-
ments often do not supply details of the drilling ﬂuid chemicals and all too
frequently tell us what the compounds do not contain rather than exactly
what they do contain. In 2015, it was acknowledged by an industry-funded
task force on shale gas that fracking companies still only disclosed the chemicals
they used to the English Environment Agency by agreement in principle, and
there was no requirement to disclose to the public.53
This has severely compromised the ability to characterize risk from UGE
appropriately. For example, recent assessments of the environmental disease
burden across Europe for airborne pollutants, including some present in
UGE, noted the inability to estimate health impacts in highly exposed (e.g.,
occupational exposures) and particularly susceptible groups (gender, age,
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genetic predisposition).55 Knowledge gaps related to environmental equity,
feasibility of policy measures, accountability studies, evaluating health beneﬁts,
well-being and risk perception, and associated uncertainties are severe in relation
to UGE HIAs, and until they are comprehensively addressed, precautionary
responses to planning applications for UGE should be adopted.
Moreover, waste management plans for UGE rarely provide proper risk assess-
ments of what is used, what is released, what is a pollutant, and what is a waste
product, and often perfectly illustrate the failure to adopt a transparent approach
that enables public health risks to be assessed just from the waste management
process. These plans frequently do not properly describe how human health may
be aﬀected by contaminated wastewater, by-products, and pollutants or by acci-
dental methane releases during extraction. There is little, if any, detailed and
regular independent validation or monitoring of these processes. Typically, full
material safety data sheets and any published research studies attesting to the
accuracy of those data sheets are not provided or referenced. This means that a
proper assessment cannot be made of chemicals that may go into the wells and
then come back in various forms in the produced water and so then potentially
have waste management health impacts. Wastes are deﬁned as nonhazardous, but
often no detail of the content of the drilling ﬂuids (beyond an assertion that they
are nontoxic and harmless) and sludges is disclosed.
In summary, recognized international and national public health bodies14,56
have identiﬁed a lack of complete risk and HIAs for the UGE industry and
concluded that UGE will do little to slow global warming while posing substan-
tial potential risks to public health through water, air, worker, and other expos-
ures.14 Many data gaps exist as well as some evidence of the adverse eﬀects of
materials at extremely low doses.52 Very recent research indicates increasing
causes for concern relating to the substances that may be used in UGE.14,51,57
Risk assessment should lead to the prevention of potentially major public health
adverse eﬀects, but the risk–cost–beneﬁt analysis of UGE at local and national
level based on the available evidence reveals the existence of far greater potential
public health risks than beneﬁts.
Given the emerging evidence about the public health impacts of UGE,49 the
fact that exposed populations in the UK are likely to include dense urban settle-
ments, and the acknowledged climate challenge associated with our use of fossil
fuels, the policy trajectory favoring UGE in the UK appears to be unintelligible
from a public health or environmental perspective. Thus, one can only conclude
that the political economy of UGE is the prime driver of the UK’s “dash for gas.”
Planning and UGE: Scaling and Scoping HIA in the
Public Interest
HIAs are viewed as an important tool to inform planning in EIAs of UGE
proposals. However, environment statements and EIAs are not comprehensive,
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often omitting to address wider public health impacts, and there is no EU dir-
ective to cover all aspects of UGE.43 A further problem is one of scale and scope
of UGE applications. All too often planning applications are submitted for a
local site with just a few wells. However, further separate applications may
generate an overall scale and impact that can be huge. Yet, there will only
have been fragmented and isolated HIAs for each smaller development which
cannot address the cumulative impact of multiple planning applications. While
planning applications “preclude” looking at the bigger picture, for eﬀective
HIAs, this should be required. Issues raised by ten wells versus six hundred
wells may be rather diﬀerent.
Even when proposals are initially rejected, refusal of proposals may be over-
turned in planning bodies’ HIA thinking in favor of approvals with mitigation
without evidence for such decisions, including baseline health studies. This
ignores the application of the precautionary principle to public health actions.58
In 2008, researchers in Colorado found “Data necessary to completely assess the
health and social impacts of the oil and gas industry are missing in all areas,
including: population demographics, health status, psychological status, social
measures, worker health, and environmental exposure.”59 In many parts of
Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America, that remains the position despite
repeated warnings from researchers about “balancing the need for energy with
the protection of the public’s health” in the “rush to drill for natural gas.”60
Planning regulations in the northern hemisphere may still restrict, either dir-
ectly or indirectly, the participation of communities aﬀected by UGE and their
access to information. In the southern hemisphere, regulation may be even
weaker. HIAs should prevent this happening. However, the UGE planning pro-
cess tends to favor large multinational companies with considerable legal, ﬁnan-
cial, and technical resources which can buy expertise. The parameters for
appeals are often narrow and technical. Local authorities, unlike industry,
also have very limited resources and often have limited expertise, as do some gov-
ernmental agencies dealing with environmental protection and worker health.
Small communities usually have no external ﬁnancial resources. Yet, as one U.S.
researcher presciently observed with regard to Marcellus shale activities:
Any attempt to understand and respond to the potential adverse health conse-
quences of Marcellus Shale activities will fail unless the community is involved. . . .
Causally related health impacts will be missed . . . . Negative ﬁndings will be dis-
missed and . . . multigenerational equity is central. What happens to the community
when the gas runs out?61
Not all changes in government policies have been damaging to communities.
In Scotland, for example, the government in April 2013 removed its presumption
in favor of UGE developments and “urged councils to create buﬀer zones
between developments and communities.”62 This was extended in early 2015
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to a two-year moratorium on UGE development in Scotland. This period will be
used to review regulatory systems, capacity, and conduct analyses of environ-
mental and economic impacts of UGE. The industry response has initially
involved an intensiﬁcation of public relations and public aﬀairs activity to
secure consent for UGE among local communities, and also among opinion
formers and regulators.63,64
Experts for Hire? Commissioning and Contesting
HIA Consultancy
Companies tend to use particular consultants for their EIAs who rarely focus in
detail on health impacts. We are unaware of any evidence that a UGE company
has ever employed an EIA consultancy company that produced and published
an ES containing an HIA highly critical of that company’s plans. Mitigation is
by deﬁnition the default process proposed. Some HIAs and related statements
for UGE companies appear to have come oﬀ a production line. This may be due
to the HIA process itself because it relies on a ﬁxed framework and an easily
replicable technical approach. The data that are used in them, however, some-
times look highly selective as we discussed earlier in the paper.
There are assumptions that politicians and communities are either all
biased, ill-informed, or victims of scaremongering in their resistance to UGE
developments and do not understand the science underpinning this industry.
However, communities do not resemble this caricature and community members
can challenge HIA professionals quite strongly partly because some are scientists
and lawyers themselves and fully understand the technical and planning argu-
ments.65 The HIA process expects meaningful engagement with communities but
is not always achieved by consultants.
There has been a growing stream of scientiﬁc papers and reports on exposures
and knowledge gaps, regulatory and industry deﬁciencies. These cast serious
doubt on UGE risk assessments and risk management responses if consultants
have limited resources and staﬀ to keep up to date with the large and increasing
volumes of scientiﬁc literature on UGE. Thus, exactly on what basis HIA prac-
titioners acting as consultants from UGE companies assess such impacts accur-
ately and come to conclusions suggesting little risk is unclear. There are
assumptions by some HIA consultants that the UGE industry can be trusted
in its own assessments of risks and how it engages in community consultation.
Again communities and their representatives would challenge this in terms of a
lack of transparency and meaningful consultation.66–68
UGE HIAs for industry largely ignore questions of mental health and well-
being, which are far more than simplistic statements about communities misun-
derstanding risks and needing assurances their jobs, homes, house prices, and
livelihoods will not be aﬀected by UGE developments. Sometimes, discredited
research institutes (for example, in Texas and Pennsylvania) have been used both
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by the industry and indeed governments to promote a pro-UGE case.32 Conﬂict
of interest may be the source of this problem:
those with vested interests (e.g. the oil and gas industry) can and do fund the study
[of HIA] as part of their statutory obligation to conduct an EIA. Furthermore, the
lack of public health resources and capabilities to undertake HIAs has driven a
growth in international HIA consultants. If an HIA is commissioned the likelihood
is that it will be paid for by a developer. . . .Clearly this could be construed as a
conﬂict of interest and compromise the study ﬁndings.69
The growth in commercial HIA may also be inﬂuencing HIA practice, for ill or
good, but this has not been investigated rigorously. There is also little if any
detailed discussion of how HIA practitioners view the precautionary principle
with regard to the UGE industry.
Shifting Sands? UGE Regulation, Imperfect Information,
and the “Dash for Gas”
UGE regulation remains highly problematic.29,56,58,59 UK commentators have
identiﬁed major problems with the UK UGE regulatory system, its lack of spe-
ciﬁc regulations, the absence of an independent competent body, and the
downsizing or scrapping of key parts of agencies charged with safeguarding
the environment, public health, and worker safety.70 The recommendations of
the UK industry-funded Task Force on Shale Gas71 for a bespoke regulator
for onshore underground energy (potentially assuming powers from the
Environment Agency, Health and Safety Executive [HSE] and the Department
of Energy and Climate Change) and a diminished EIA that was to be “more
succinct and approachable than a full-blown EIA”71 highlight clearly that the
regulatory battleground for UGE will be the subject of concentrated lobbying
and policy activism. It is unlikely that such a regulatory system will properly
protect public health and the public interest. In the United States, the regulation
of UGE has historically been deﬁcient.72 Current rules will only target air emis-
sions and stop ﬂaring from 2015. Companies like BP, active in unconventional
gas operations across Africa, Asia, and the United States, also have poor records
on health and safety management ﬂagged by the U.S. government. BP even
produces brieﬁngs on fracking that do not speciﬁcally mention public health.73
Part of the reason is that shale gas production is a tricky regulatory target.
The sector is diverse (spanning large transnational corporations and various
contractors, comprising “drilling companies, hydraulic fracturing service
companies, chemical suppliers, waste haulers, water purveyors, and cement con-
tractors”); the sources of potential pollution vary (comprising wells,
compressors, storage tanks, wastewater management) and are geographically
dispersed, meaning “compliance determination becomes a frustrating and
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necessarily arbitrary process, compounded by public sector budget cuts, and loss
of key agency personnel to industry”74; governance is dispersed; the industry is
often hostile to regulation, meaning that industry is also “reluctant to acknow-
ledge risk”; and there remain signiﬁcant data gaps.74
Many countries including the UK have adopted an openly deregulatory
agenda that privileges industry.75 The UGE industry enjoys both very close
ﬁnancial links with the oil industry and privileged access for industry leaders
to ministers and senior civil servants. The powers, staﬃng, and resources of
regulatory bodies dealing with worker and community health and safety, and
environmental protection, both north and south of the English/Scottish border,
have been signiﬁcantly diminished. The HSE budget was cut by 13 percent from
£228 million in 2009–2010 to £199 m in 2011–2012, with further cuts planned.
Its staﬀ numbers were reduced by 22 percent from 3702 in 2010 to 2889 up to
2012.75 Where they have not been cut, they are very limited in what they can do
and, as currently resourced, are incapable of eﬀectively monitoring either appli-
cations or operations of UGE.
Little readily publicly available detailed information exists on how exactly
regulators will tackle the environmental challenges presented by UGE.76 In the
UK, UGE is covered by general and speciﬁc provisions including the Borehole
Site and Operations Regulations 1995, the Oﬀshore Installations and Wells
(Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations 1996 that has some relevance to
onshore shale gas wells. HSE Mines Specialist Inspectors and Oﬀshore
Inspectors may therefore cover UGE. Proactive HSE inspections have declined
signiﬁcantly over more than a decade. It is noteworthy that no breaches have
ever been recorded by HSE in recent years with regard to the 1995 Borehole
Regulations in industrial sectors known to be highly hazardous even before
UGE appeared on the health and safety scene. If a large number of approvals
are granted, the extent to which drilling will be scrutinized closely by specialist
wells inspectors from the HSE or any new bespoke regulator for onshore under-
ground energy therefore remains a contentious point.
In 2006, for example, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency noted:
“The protection of human health is not a primary duty of SEPA. This rests
with a number of other agencies, principally Local Authorities and the Food
Standards Agency.”77 Yet, updated guidance in 2015 provides for the Scottish
Environment Protection Agency to contribute to “improving the health and
well-being of people in Scotland, and achieving sustainable economic growth.”78
Although UK agencies and government departments such as the Department for
Energy and Climate Change, the Environment Agency and PHE consider there
is a high degree of protection provided by EU regulations that may apply to
UGE, several reports submitted to the EU draw very diﬀerent conclusions and
indicate problems with regulation.42 There is an urgent need for impartial advice
on UGE to be available to regulators, local authorities, workers, and commu-
nities, which currently is not the case.14,43,56,58,79 Industry arguments about the
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eﬃcacy of the regulation and their management of UGE are simply not borne
out by the facts and this should be carefully considered in assessing any UGE
ESs.29,44,75
Ethics and Equity
Ethics and equity are regarded as important components of HIA. However,
there is often a built-in inequity in the HIA process related to access to funding
and expertise. UGE developments in areas of rural and industrial deprivation,
where poorer communities with poorer health status may be even less able to
contest planning applications, can compound existing inequalities.
No formal body exists to control the conduct and practice of those carrying
out HIAs within ESs or environmental impact statements. However, guidelines
have been issued that could address some of the technical and democratic deﬁcits
that have emerged. The key values that should govern how HIAs promote and
maximize public health are “democracy, equity, sustainable development and
ethical use of evidence.”80 The International Association for Impact Assessment
(IAIA) has added a ﬁfth “guiding principle” for HIA, namely a “comprehensive
approach to health.” “HIA is most fundamentally concerned with the principles
‘do good and do not harm’. . . . . .HIA provides a well-established approach to
identifying both positive and negative impacts that may arise from a
proposal.”81,82
UGE environmental impact statements containing HIAs rarely address either
equity or sustainable development and therefore do not reﬂect best practice.
In addition, some UGE HIAs do not demonstrate an ethical use of evidence
by making sweeping generalizations about risk and citing only those studies
suggesting no signiﬁcant public health risks. IAIA promotes the application of
holistic, integrated, and participatory approaches to impact assessment, con-
ducted to the highest professional standards and with freedom of access to
information and addressing broader social and health impacts. Yet, there are
major problems with how UGE HIAs have been conducted, including fragmen-
tation; disregard for community well-being and mental health; belittling com-
munity concerns; and lack of true participation (related to lack of consultation
and information/power skewed in favor of developers). Perhaps of greatest con-
cern is that the IAIA “acknowledges a duty of care to both present and future
generations”; yet, UGE impact assessments do not address global or local public
health consequences of using a greenhouse gas energy source. While the IAIA
commits to sustainable development, 83 the unresolved questions regarding
UGE’s sustainability present IAIA members, all voluntary, with a huge
problem.
One additional professional responsibility is that members “do not advance
our private interests to the detriment of the public, our clients or employing
institutions.”83 How public interests can be safeguarded when consultants’
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reports are paid for by the UGE companies themselves is unclear and merits
urgent attention.
Some health bodies have also provided useful recommendations about key
guiding principles for dealing with shale gas developments that include both
public health ethics considerations and technical elements.84 For example,
Section 41 of the Canadian Medical Association Code of Ethics requires that
a physician should “recognize that community, society and the environment are
important factors in the health of individual patients.” These elements merit
serious discussion yet are routinely ignored in the dash for gas in Europe and
the United States. A notable exception is the Chief Medical Oﬃcer’s report
“Recommendations concerning Shale Gas Development in New Brunswick
Province” which adopts an integrated approach to the prevention of public
health hazards, insisting public health assessment should:
Identify, prevent and respond to health hazards that pose a risk to public health
during all phases of the shale gas industry in New Brunswick. Fulﬁlling this object-
ive will involve planning, implementing and evaluating risk assessment and man-
agement strategies to address these hazards, as well as enforcement, and enhancing
data collection systems for population health assessment, surveillance and
dissemination.84
Conclusions
There are technical and democratic deﬁcits in the way that UGE proposals are
assessed by HIAs and in the evidence base used to inform decisions about the
public health impacts of such projects. The rigor and independence of parts of
the HIA industry is questionable. Changes in both UGE and regulatory practice
in relation to HIA are necessary. In particular, the vexed question of how the
public interest is secured via planning, environmental, and occupational health
and safety laws is pressing in relation to vetting UGE proposals, regulating the
UGE industry, and establishing and monitoring good practice and ethics among
HIA consultants. The wider question of the intergenerational equity of continu-
ing to use fossil fuels is one that requires serious consideration, thoughtful policy
development, and leadership. The recent UK government decision to scale back
subsidies for renewable energy85 makes this a particularly charged policy ﬁeld.
Independent experts, including HIA specialists, are very likely to become
important arbiters in whether and how UGE develops in the UK.
The one key defense of the UK UGE proposals by government and industry
has been a claim that industry will surpass existing best practice, in particular,
improving on practice in the United States—and that regulation and enforce-
ment will be eﬀective. Neither claim stands up to close scrutiny. Multinational
industry practice has been ﬂawed, 40,86 and the existing regulatory structure in
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the UK for UGE is seriously fragmented, deﬁcient in scope, and lacks regulatory
expertise and capacity. Moreover, the assessment of UGE as a low-risk activity
is unsupported by evidence and calls for the application of the precautionary
principle,87 particularly if planning bodies are to ensure that public health and
community well-being are prioritized in decision making around UGE. As one
commentator recently observed:
Delayed recognition of adverse eﬀects due to the some of the above [list of sub-
stances including asbestos, tobacco, mercury, endocrine disruptors, benzene]
incurred not only serious environmental or health impacts, but massive expense
and reductions in competitiveness for ﬁrms and economies persisting in the wrong
path. . . .Innovations reinforcing fossil fuel energy strategies – such as hydraulic
fracturing – arguably oﬀer a contemporary prospective example.88
Ensuring that public health considerations are addressed in UGE applications
requires that baseline health data are available in assessing proposals. Absence
of evidence from UGE companies about the past public health impacts of their
activities—again locally, regionally, and nationally—should not be taken as evi-
dence of absence of problems in the future.
While the precautionary principle has been incorporated into many European
directives and policy statements since the 1990s, it has been the subject of an
intellectual backlash and political assault by those who believe it places intoler-
able burdens on business and stymies development.
The issue of public health in relation to UGE has a number of dimensions
that recommend a strong version of the precautionary approach, regardless of
how policy makers might orient to the wider debate about climate change. The
emerging evidence from those places where UGE and fracking have been under-
taken is suggestive of a number of signiﬁcant public health risks.89–92
A recent and extensive review of UGE environmental health impacts that
omitted any exploration of HIA techniques and emanating from an institute
with some industry funding came to the following conclusion. Many studies
lacked rigor and could not demonstrate adverse eﬀects from UGE but signiﬁ-
cantly added “there is also no evidence to rule out such health impacts” and
“public health concerns remain intense.”93
To deploy this technology on an industrial scale in more densely populated
regions is a highly risky policy route given the current state of knowledge,
industry, and regulatory practice. The absence of reliable data on the chemicals
used means that fully assessing the likely short- and long-term impacts asso-
ciated with UGE is virtually impossible. What is already known of the chemicals
used points to the need to avoid exposures.50–52 The conclusions of the most
exhaustive analysis to date of the health impacts of fracking by New York State
are instructive in this regard: “In the end, there are no feasible or prudent
alternatives that would adequately avoid or minimize adverse environmental
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impacts and that address the scientiﬁc uncertainties and risks to public health
from this activity.”49
Action at local and municipal level is also called for. In the United States,
even very small communities within counties have commissioned meaningful
HIAs of proposed UGE developments.94 These impact assessments have
noted adverse as well as neutral and potentially positive eﬀects of these devel-
opments in ways far more balanced than those from professional HIA and EIA
consultants employed by the UGE industry.
The case for applying the precautionary principle in dealing with UGE is sup-
ported by the European Environment Agency’s approach to carcinogens and
endocrine disruptors95and in the APHA’s recommendations on UGE, explicitly
noting that where the eﬀects of chemicals are unknown andwhere the potential for
long-term eﬀects (such as cancers) and endocrine disruption exist, their use should
be discouraged.14 The failure to apply the precautionary principle with regard to
Scottish shale oil plants has a long history with the ﬁrst occupational cancers
reported in 1875 and still many cases were being reported occurring in 1922.
As the United Nations Environment Programme observed: “given the uncer-
tainty in terms ofGreenHouseGas emissions, public health, environmental issues
and depletion of water resources, the continued development of UG reserves is an
option which brings with it great responsibility.”41 Industry-funded HIAs too
often have failed to grasp that responsibility. Explaining how HIA’s can produce
such seemingly perverse outcomes requires some understanding of the political
economy and governance of UGE and related industries.
Science has often been used in service of the interests of powerful commercial
actors. Such actors, be they mining, extraction, engineering, or investment com-
panies, develop their business strategies based on the regulatory and political
environment within which their executives and lobbyists are located.37,39 This
means, in eﬀect, that companies make their assessments of what is viable, prof-
itable, and indeed sustainable in relation to the prevailing climate of elite opinion.
In theUK, there have been clear and consistent signals from government encoura-
ging investment in UGE (not least in recent budget announcements) in an over-
arching political climate sympathetic to the basic nostrums of neoliberalism.
The SEAs available for onshore UGE do not yet answer whether such activ-
ities should be conducted at all and what global and national threats to health
they may present because their focus is on sustainable development whilst
enhancing beneﬁts and avoiding, reducing or managing adverse eﬀects.7
Moreover, the very concepts of sustainable development and sustainability
have been eﬀectively captured by business interests37,96 and reshaped so as to
present little threat or constraint to virtually any business development. This
includes UGE, which by any other recognizable environmental or public health
standard would be considered unacceptable and at the same time, public health
can often be sidelined in UGE development plans.58,79,97 For such ideologies to
be successful also requires the quiescence of regulators. They are also aided by
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national or global policies and practices that play down both public health and
eﬀective community engagement in the debate about UGE beneﬁts and risks.
Hence, a key battle ground in the future development of UGE in the UK will be
the regulatory complex that governs these technologies and processes. PHIA will
be at the center of such contests between public and private interests. It is
therefore vital that such assessments are independent, robust, enable equitable
participation by all stakeholders, including local communities, and above all, are
guided by the precautionary principle.
How HIA professionals respond to this challenge and to what extent the UK
nations will follow the example set by the APHA and New York State,49,98 in
their diﬀerent ways model examples of what is needed, remains to be seen.
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